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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND EBOLA RESPONSE:
LEARNING FROM THE 2017 OUTBREAK IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO †
SAM HALABI,* REBECCA KATZ** & AMANDA MCCLELLAND ***
INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that the
Ebola outbreak in east Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was a public
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) under the International
Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the fifth declaration since the agreement
entered into force in 2007. 1 Despite availability of a vaccine and the introduction
of a second vaccine candidate, the current Ebola outbreak has not been brought
under control. As of this writing, many public health officials are worried over
border closures, even though WHO did not recommend travel or trade

† Data included in this article resulted from work funded by Resolve to Save Lives and the
Wellcome Trust.
* Sam Halabi is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and a Scholar
at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University. He is also
the co-chair of the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Working Group of the Global Virome
Project. He holds a JD from Harvard Law School, an MPhil from the University of Oxford (St.
Antony’s College) and a B.S., summa cum laude, from Kansas State University.
** Rebecca Katz is Professor and Director of the Center for Global Health Science and Security at
Georgetown University. She earned her undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College, an
M.P.H. from Yale University, and a Ph.D. from Princeton University.
*** Amanda McClelland is the Senior Vice-President, Prevent Epidemics, at Resolve to Save
Lives. She was formerly the Global Emergency Health Advisor for the International Federation of
Red Cross Red Crescent (IFRC) where she focused on emergency health, epidemic control, mass
casualty in low resource settings, disease prevention and response operations. Amanda earned her
Master of Public Health and Tropical Medicine from James Cook University in Queensland,
Australia and her Bachelor of Nursing from Queensland University of Technology.
1. Int’l Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Comm. for Ebola Virus Disease in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Statement on the meeting of the International Health
Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee for Ebola virus disease in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo on 17 July 2019 (2019), https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/statement-emergencycommittee-ebola-drc-july-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGM4-FYJ7]; Helen Branswell, WHO
Declares Ebola Outbreak an International Emergency, July 17, 2019 avaialable at https://www.stat
news.com/2019/07/17/who-declares-ebola-outbreak-an-international-health-emergency/
[https://perma.cc/QYP3-FBHD] (“This marks only the fifth time the WHO has declared a public
health emergency of international concern.”).
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restrictions. Armed conflict and local resistance in the region has stymied the
global response.
These events are reminiscent of the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak in West Africa,
when the aftermath of civil conflict, the closure of borders, and a fragmented
initial response contributed to the most deadly Ebola outbreak on record. 2 The
resulting retrospective criticism, comprised of no fewer than seven major and
approximately forty international collaborative reviews, called into question the
effective implementation of the IHR. 3 Trade and travel restrictions imposed by
the neighbors of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as well as other European
and African countries strongly suggested that in the face of a real pandemic
emergency, the countries of the world could be relied upon to abandon
internationalism and international institutions and adopt country-first policies,
no matter how counterproductive.
While calls for reform were justified and many of the recommendations
following the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak are under way, the purpose of
this article is to shed light on a subsequent episode of Ebola outbreak and
response in the DRC that emphasizes the effective implementation of not only
the IHR, but the successful incorporation of international collaborative
relationships that quickly addressed an outbreak in the northern DRC, and paved
the way for the rapid deployment of biomedical interventions. The DRC’s
surveillance system identified Ebola quickly, bolstered by a national planning
system revised in light of the West Africa Ebola outbreak, WHO and
international partners including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent, and Doctors Without Borders responded quickly and adroitly, and the
outbreak ended with only eight cases. 4 Identifying effective implementation of
international law when outbreak responses succeed—in some cases despite
numerous barriers and limited resources—can assist in articulating fullydeveloped strategies for improving future outbreak responses and global health
security. It argues that the IHR may be, and often are, an iterative or learning
agreement, and that much learning informed the DRC response in 2017 and two
outbreak responses in 2018. Given that the current outbreak in the DRC has not,
as of this writing, been brought under control, it is important to understand the
limits of this thesis even within the conditions we analyze. Yet, we believe that
understanding how learning works within the IHR implementation process may

2. G.A. Res. 69/1, 1 (Sep. 23 2014); S.C. Res. 2177, 1–3, ¶ 3–4 (Sep. 18, 2014).
3. Surie Moon et al., Will Ebola change the game? Ten essential reforms before the next
pandemic. The report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola,
386 LANCET 2204, 2207 (2015).
4. 2017 Democratic Republic of the Congo - Bas Uélé District Outbreak Report, CENTER
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CDC.GOV, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/drc/2017-may.html
[https://perma.cc/D8QQ-AYGB] (last visited August 23, 2019).
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lead to better compliance and better outcomes including the cohesive
cooperation between national and international actors.
Methodologically, the Article applies the obligations imposed under
Articles 4-6 and 13 of the IHR to the two Ebola outbreaks and demonstrates how
the DRC system internalized the lessons of the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak. Articles
4-15 of the IHR are the primary information sharing and public health readiness
provisions. 5 Articles 7-12 and Article 14 are not separately analyzed either
because their obligations are relevant within a previous discussion (e.g. Article
9 deals with “other reports” WHO may receive to determine whether there is a
public health emergency of international concern, 6 but that analysis is
undertaken with respect to Article 5) or because they are simply not relevant to
the analysis (e.g. those provisions dealing exclusively with WHO decisionmaking). The Article then compares the national-international nexus for each
outbreak and response.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the legal background to the
two Ebola outbreaks—the IHR—and the etiological and epidemiological
background to Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) more generally. Part II identifies the
failures of international public health law between April 2014 and May 2015
and compares those failures with the success of the IHR between May and July
2017 in the DRC. Part III provides a conclusion.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS AND THE EBOLA THREAT
When international law-makers established WHO they intended to give it
strong law-making and regulatory authority. 7 Article 19 of the WHO
Constitution authorized it to conclude treaties within its broadly worded
mandate while Article 21 gave the World Health Assembly the authority to adopt
legally binding recommendations in five discrete areas: sanitary and quarantine
regulations; nomenclatures on diseases, causes of death, and public health
practices; standards for diagnostic procedures for international use; standards for
safety, purity, and potency of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products
moving in international commerce; and advertising and labeling of biological,
pharmaceutical, and similar products moving in international commerce. 8
Article 22 established the binding legal effect of these regulations unless states
opted out of them within the notification period, an innovation which collapsed

5. WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations, arts. 4–15 (2005),
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/ [https://perma.cc/D4YE-LJ36].
6. WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations, arts. 7–12, 14 (2005),
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/ [https://perma.cc/MN6S-R66P].
7. George Codding, Jr., Contributions of the World Health Organization and the
International Civil Aviation Organization to the Development of International Law, 59
PROCEEDINGS OF ASIL 147, 147-48 (1965).
8. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Const. arts. 19, 21.
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the usual drawn-out ratification process historically experienced in the
international law-making process. 9
One of the first exercises of this authority was to adopt the International
Sanitary Regulations, an international agreement that resurrected and
rationalized moribund international treaties that addressed international traffic
and quarantine policies oriented at plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox,
louse-borne typhus, and relapsing fever. 10 WHO updated the regulations and
renamed them in 1969 (hence the official name of the agreement, the
International Health Regulations (1969)), eventually narrowing their reach to
yellow fever, cholera, and plague by 1981 and expanding the monitoring and
control mechanisms applicable to those diseases. 11 The resurgence of cholera in
South America, plague in India, and Ebola in Africa, as well as the emergence
of HIV as a global pandemic, encouraged the world’s countries to consider
further, more extensive revision. 12
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the emergence of new infectious diseases
like HIV and viral hemorrhagic fevers. 13 Between 1994 and 2000, for example,
there were as many outbreaks of EVD in Africa as there had been in the twenty
years before. 14 In 1995, the World Health Assembly, the governing body of
WHO, instructed WHO’s Director General to revisit the IHR precisely because
they neglected “the emergence of new infectious agents” and failed to provide
for an adequate response of those that were covered. 15 The World Health
Assembly attributed these failures to the erosion of barriers between goods and
people. 16 In 2003, the outbreak of SARS facilitated the 2005 revisions of the

9. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Const. arts. 19, 21–22.
10. Editorial, International Sanitary Regulations, 147 [J]AMA 62, 63–64 (1951).
11. Richard A. Cash & Vasant Narasimhan, Impediments to global surveillance of infectious
diseases: consequences of open reporting in a global economy, 78 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1358, 1359 (2000), https://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/78
(11)1358.pdf [https://perma.cc/52A2-N546].
12. Frequently asked questions about the International Health Regulations (2005),
WHO.GOV, https://www.who.int/ihr/about/faq/en/ [https://perma.cc/9WND-8NYA].
13. David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations: An
Historic Development for International law and Public Health, 34 J.L. MED. ETHICS 85, 85 (2006).
14. Ramon Martinez, Chronology of Ebola Virus Disease outbreaks, 1976-2014, HEALTH
INTELLIGENCE (June 10, 2014, 4:01 AM), http://publichealthintelligence.org/content/chronologyebola-virus-disease-outbreaks-1976-2014 [https://perma.cc/529K-26KE].
15. WHO - Revision process of the International Health Regulations (IHR), WHO.GOV,
http://www.who.int/ihr/revisionprocess/revision/en/index.html
[https://perma.cc/KC82-NALZ]
(last visited August 30, 2019).
16. Rebeca Katz & Julie Fischer, The Revised International Health Regulations: A Framework
for Global Pandemic Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2010). The threat of the
Ebola virus and the emerging HIV/AIDS crisis (among other viruses) were major factors the global
community considered when advocating revisions to the existing IHR. Id.
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IHR, by highlighting the speed by which an emerging infectious disease can
travel around the world and the dearth of tools to govern the global spread. 17
A.

The Scope of the IHR (2005)

The IHR (2005) was revised to encompass the detection and prevention of
all infectious diseases. 18 Their scope was expanded “to include any event that
would constitute a public health emergency of international concern.” 19 “‘The
Regulations now encompass public health risks whatever their origin or source
(Article 1.1), including: (1) naturally occurring infectious diseases, whether of
known or unknown etiological origin . . .’” 20
Acknowledging the importance of communication and cooperation to
successful detection and prevention of communicable diseases, States Parties are
obligated to “develop the means to detect, report, and respond to public health
emergencies . . . [and] establish a National IHR Focal Point (NFP) 21 for
communication to and from WHO . . . .” 22 States Parties must inform WHO
within twenty-four hours of an assessment of any event that could be considered
a “public health risk to other States requiring a coordinated international
response.” 23 Ebola was a specified disease in the revised IHR, Annex 2, that is,
its detection was likely to have significant public health impact and to potentially
spread internationally. 24
17. David P. Fidler, Revision of the World Health Organization’s International Health
Regulations, ASIL INSIGHTS (April 16, 2004), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/8/
revision-world-health-organizations-international-health-regulations [https://perma.cc/G4Y5-BH
8B].
18. The stated purpose is to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health
response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted
to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and
trade.” WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations, art. 2 (2005), https://www.who.
int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/ [https://perma.cc/ZGX4-3EAX].
19. Katz & Fischer, supra note 16, at 2.
20. Martin Cetron, Isolation, Quarantine, and Infectious Disease Threats Arising From
Global Migration, GLOBAL MANAGEMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE AFTER EBOLA, 245, 251 (Sam
F. Halabi, Lawrence O. Gostin, and Jeffrey S. Crowley eds. 2017) (quoting Fidler & Gostin, supra
note 13, at 86).
21. The NFP is a “national centre, established or designated by each State Party [and] must be
accessible at all times for IHR (2005)-related communications with WHO.” International Health
Regulations Coordination, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005): TOOLKIT FOR
IMPLEMENTATION IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION 7 (2009). As of July 2009, ninety-nine percent of
all State have established an NFP. Id.
22. Katz & Fischer, supra note 16, at 2-3.
23. Id. at 3. Once an incident has been reported, WHO will then “coordinate communications
across nations, provide technical assistance to responding nations, and work with international
scientific experts to develop recommendations for mitigating the consequences of the event.” Id.
24. WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations, annex 2 (2005),
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/ [https://perma.cc/Z68Y-FNK8].
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Epidemiological investigations have revealed that human infections with the
Ebola virus are associated with the handling of infected chimpanzees, gorillas,
fruit bats, monkeys, forest antelope, and porcupines. 25 Human-to-human
transmission of Ebola occurs through close and direct physical contact with
infected bodily fluids; the most infectious being blood, feces, and vomit. 26 The
2013-15 outbreak was the twenty-fourth known outbreak of Ebola and by far the
most severe. 27 A new outbreak occurred in the DRC in August of 2014, May of
2017, and then the following year on April 4, 2018. 28 For the latter outbreak, “a
total of 38 laboratory confirmed and 15 probable cases (deaths for which it was
not possible to collect laboratory specimens for testing) have been reported. 29
Of these 53 cases, 29 died, giving a case fatality ratio of 54.7%.” 30 On August
1, 2018, a new outbreak was officially declared in North Kivu province of the
DRC, on the other side of the country from the April outbreak, an outbreak that
continues, fueled by armed conflict and interference with the international
response effort. 31 With a case fatality rate of 55%, Ebola remains a biomedical
research priority. 32
II. IHR PERFORMANCE FROM 2014-16 WEST AFRICA TO 2017 DRC
A.

Background to the 2014 West Africa Outbreak

Although the outbreak of EVD in West Africa originated in Guinea between
December of 2013 and March of 2014, it spread more rapidly in the eastern
regions of Sierra Leone and then in North Central Liberia, followed by
Nzérékoré in Guinea. 33 “Between December 2013 and April 10, 2016, a total of
25. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 30, 2019), http://www.who.int/newsroom/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-disease [https://perma.cc/G5F6-UFGD].
26. Seth Judson, et al., Understanding Ebola Virus Transmission, VIRUSES (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4353901/ [https://perma.cc/2Q9M-29KR].
27. Johnathan Corum, A History of Ebola in 24 Outbreaks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/30/science/history-of-ebola-in-24-outbreaks.html
[https://perma.cc/38VW-4A8K].
28. Health Emergency Information and Risk Management, WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ebola
Virus Disease: Democratic Republic of Congo External Situation Report 15 (Jul. 12, 2018),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/273088/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20180712-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3YB-ADE2].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Megan Specia, Years After Latest Ebola Outbreak New Cases Emerge in Congo, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/world/africa/ebola-congorwanda.html [https://perma.cc.4GUC-QZJV].
32. Ebola Vaccines – Background Paper for SAGE Deliberations, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.who.int/immunization/sage/meetings/2018/october/2_Ebola_SAGE
2018Oct_BgDoc_20180919.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4Q3-JGG9].
33. WHO Ebola Response Team, After Ebola in West Africa - Unpredictable Risks,
Preventable Epidemics, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 587, 588 (2016).
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28,616 suspected, probable, and confirmed cases of EVD were reported.” 34 A
total of 11,310 deaths were attributed to the outbreak. 35 The largest numbers of
cases and deaths occurred in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, but thirty-six
cases were reported from Italy, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. 36 After peaking at approximately 950
confirmed cases per week in September of 2014, the incidence dropped
precipitously toward the end of that year. 37
The IHR in 2005 required Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to have
surveillance and detection infrastructure in place to detect Ebola and to promptly
notify WHO should they receive a reportable event. 38 Civil wars in or affecting
all three countries had devastated what weak health infrastructure existed, and
external assistance would have been critical to bridge the gap between their
capacity and what the IHR envisioned. This is true in many countries, and initial
information led many in the international community to believe Ebola would be
contained in West Africa as it had in equatorial Africa. Because WHO
maintained significant activities in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and cases
reported in Guinea and Liberia between April and May technically declined,
WHO, for example, believed that that the virus dynamics were not unlike those
of past outbreaks. 39
B.

Background to the 2017 Ebola outbreak in DRC

The DRC has a long history with detecting and responding to EVD. The
virus was first identified near the eponymous Ebola River in then-Zaire, in
1976. 40 Since 1976, there have been ten Ebola outbreaks in the DRC. 41 This
experience played a role in the commitment of the central government in
Kinshasa to specialized laboratory, health worker, and health facility
infrastructure for Ebola response.
“On April 22, 2017, the Nambwa health center received a 45-year-old (early
reports stated 39-year-old) male subject with presenting symptoms including
34. Id. at 587.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also 2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html [https://per
ma.cc/A3T8-EFGD] (last reviewed Mar. 8, 2019).
37. WHO Ebola Response Team, supra note 33, at 587.
38. WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations (3rd ed. 2005).
39. Wolfgang Hein, Response to the West African Ebola Outbreak (2014-16): A Failure of
Global Health Governance?, in Leonie Vierck, THE GOVERNANCE OF DISEASE OUTBREAKS,
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH LAW: LESSONS FROM THE EBOLA CRISIS AND BEYOND 68 (2017).
40. History of Ebola Virus Disease, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/summaries.html [https://perma.cc/8LSY-67HX] (last
reviewed Sept. 18, 2018).
41. History of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/ebola/historical-outbreaks-drc/en/ [https://perma.cc/8QBK-HDEA].
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fever, asthenia, vomiting of blood, bloody diarrhea, hematuria, epistaxis and
extreme fatigue.” 42 “He was referred to the Reference General Hospital (RGH)
of Likati.” He died twelve kilometers before reaching the facility. 43 He traveled
by motorbike and taxi across the large province. 44 His blood was drawn on May
1, 2017. 45 “A few days later, the driver and the person behind the motorcycle
carrying the index case developed the same signs and symptoms.” 46 “An
investigation was initiated and five (5) samples were collected.” 47 “It took 10
days for the samples to reach Kinshasa, which is about 1400 kilometers from
Likati.” 48 The DRC has no roads that span the country and long-distance travel
largely is restricted to river boats and private airplanes.
On May 9, 2017, the DRC’s Ministry of Health informed WHO about the
undiagnosed illness and deaths including hemorrhagic symptoms in Likati
Health Zone, Bas Uele Province which is in the northern region of the DRC that
borders the Central African Republic. 49 The DRC Ministry of Health was able
within two days to confirm Ebola virus subtype Zaire at the Institut National de
Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) in Kinshasa. 50 Even before laboratory
confirmation, on May 10, 2017, a multidisciplinary team led by the Ministry of
Health and supported by WHO and partners was deployed to the field; the team
reached the affected area on May 13, 2017 to conduct a field investigation. 51 All
contacts (538) were identified immediately and monitored. The possibility of
introducing an Ebola ring vaccination with experimental vaccine rVSV-ZEBOV
was immediately discussed. The DRC approved the experimental vaccine
rVSV-ZEBOV for use in 2017, although the outbreak ended before the vaccine

42. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES,
Emergency Plan of Action Democratic Republic of Congo: Ebola Outbreak (May 15, 2017),
https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-drc-ebola-out
break-emergency-plan-action [https://perma.cc/PG7D-PEGQ].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Jon Cohen, Will Vaccine Help Curb Ebola Outbreak in DRC?, AM. ASSOC. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. (May 15, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/updated-willvaccine-help-curb-new-ebola-outbreak-drc [https://perma.cc/783A-WLYE].
46. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, supra note
42.
47. Id.
48. Cohen, supra note 45.
49. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets
/detail/ebola-virus-disease [https://perma.cc/DWC6-CG67] (last visited Aug. 23, 2019).
50. New technology allows for rapid diagnosis of Ebola in Democratic Republic of the Congo,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. AFRICA, https://www.afro.who.int/news/new-technology-allows-rapiddiagnosis-ebola-democratic-republic-congo [https://perma.cc/QRU6-PCX3] (last visited Aug. 23,
2019).
51. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 49.
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shipped. 52 By May 15, there were nineteen suspected cases, one confirmed case,
and three deaths. 53 While suspected cases were spread across three health zones,
the deaths occurred only in Nambwa. 54 The 2017 Ebola outbreak in the DRC
affected eight people, four of whom died. 55 One-hundred and five cases, for
whom laboratory tests revealed negative results, were recorded. 56 The outbreak
was declared over on July 2, 2017, when the last patient had tested negative for
Ebola a second time. 57
a.

Responsible Authorities (IHR Article 4)

Article 4 of the IHR requires, in pertinent part, that countries “disseminat[e]
information to, and consolidat[e] input from, relevant sectors of the
administration of the State Party concerned, including those responsible for
surveillance and reporting, points of entry, public health services, clinics and
hospitals, and other government departments.” 58
i.

West Africa

In 2014 in Guinea (and the border with Sierra Leone and Liberia), the
“sectors . . . including those responsible for surveillance and reporting” were
largely controlled by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and foreign aid
workers. 59 Many of these NGOs providing health services in Guinea and Sierra
Leone worked under agreements that authorized the sharing of relevant data only
with official health authorities and, in some cases, only with specific
administrators. 60 Requests by other NGOs for information, especially for contact
lists, were frequently rejected. 61 For instance, one district-level Ebola response
center in Sierra Leone found it problematic that NGOs engaged in contact
52. Erika C. Hayden, Experimental Drugs Poised for Use in Ebola Outbreak, NATURE (May
18, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05205-x [https://perma.cc/T5Z9-Z9GA].
53. Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Ebola
Outbreak, INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC’Y (May 15, 2017), http://adore.if
rc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=162853.
54. Id.
55. 2017 Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bas Uélé District, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/drc/2017-may.html [https://perma.cc
/W7DZ-H4ZV] (last visited Aug. 23, 2019).
56. The Ebola Epidemic Defeated in the DRC, ALIMA, https://www.alima-ngo.org/en/theebola-epidemic-defeated-in-the-drc [https://perma.cc/TC8N-9MJ9] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
57. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 55.
58. WORLD HEALTH ORG., NAT’L IHR FOCAL POINT GUIDE, Designation/establishment of
National IHR Focal Points, at 1 (2005).
59. Id.
60. Leon Schreiber, Chasing an Epidemic: Coordinating Liberia’s Response to Ebola,
INNOVATION FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIETIES, 2017, at 3.
61. Pushed to the Limit and Beyond: A year into the largest ever Ebola outbreak, MEDECINS
SANS FRONTIERES, 2015, at 8.
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tracing spontaneously but in coordination with their role of providing supplies
to families in quarantine. 62 The NGOs “took it upon themselves to start taking
temperatures, recording travel and contact histories.” 63 “There was already a
contact-tracing team from Sierra Leone’s official District Ebola Response
Centre visiting them over several days to monitor symptoms and gather
information on exposure to risk.” 64 There were several other organizations
visiting or doing similar activities, undermining the role of the centralized,
official authority. 65
Even within the formal arms of the state, there were important barriers to
consolidating and disseminating relevant information. 66 A retrospective study
by Chatham House noted that the governments, particularly in Guinea and Sierra
Leone, were conflicted about the relevance of information for compliance with
the IHR versus its potential for economic damage. 67 In some cases, the flow of
information to leaders was itself not clear: “[there was a perception that] no one
in authority wanted to admit to [Sierra Leone] President Koroma how bad the
situation was.” 68 In the Sierra Leone response, British participants stated that
“by late July 2014 they had decided that information coming out of the [Sierra
Leone Ministry of Health and Sanitation] had to be ignored.” 69
In a report by the WHO Ebola Interim Assessment Panel in January 2015, it
acknowledged that “problems with information flow and decision-making
within WHO[,] and difficult negotiations with countries” explained much of the
failure to respond as robustly as it should have, and those problems and
negotiations involved desires primarily by Guinea and Sierra Leone to control
or delay the messaging about a health emergency. 70 “Ministries overseeing both
the economy and finance [in Sierra Leone] were concerned about what closing
the borders would mean to the post-conflict improvements in Sierra Leone’s
economic outlook, which in early 2014 were significant and promising.” 71
Liberia better integrated international stakeholders. It relatively rapidly
reached out to the U.S. National Institutes of Health to work on the deployment
of promising therapeutic and vaccine candidates, ensuring that protocols to
62. EMMA ROSS, GITA HONWANA WELCH & PHILIP ANGELIDES, SIERRA LEONE’S RESPONSE
EBOLA OUTBREAK: MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND KEY RESPONDER EXPERIENCES 34
(2017).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 7.
67. ROSS, supra note 62, at 7.
68. Id. at 7-8.
69. Id. at 8.
70. WORLD HEALTH ORG., EBOLA INTERIM ASSESSMENT PANEL REPORT BY THE
SECRETARIAT, U.N. DOC. A68/25 4 (May 8, 2015).
71. Susan Erikson, Cell Phones Self and Other Problems with Big Data Detection and
Containment during Epidemics. MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q., 2018, at 322.
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administer those candidates could be done ethically and efficaciously. 72 The
Liberia Ministry of Health and Social Welfare was organized so that a National
Technical Management Coordinator aggregated epidemiological, surveillance,
mental health, contact tracing, case management, and laboratory data. 73 If the
national coordinator was not available, then data bottlenecked, a problem that
was resolved by the appointment of an incident manager and a deputy incident
manager that coordinated with large external entities like the CDC. 74
ii.

The DRC

Before the 2017 outbreak of Ebola, the universe of stakeholders, including
points of entry, public health services, clinics and hospitals, and other
government departments for Ebola response was, and is, relatively defined in
DRC. First, the provision of healthcare and the surveillance and reporting roles
is undertaken by public authorities under central ministry supervision or
coordinated with NGOs. Second, when Ebola cases emerge in remote areas of
the DRC, data about illnesses and deaths is clearly associated with known
pathogens that prevail in the country so that Ebola may be quickly distinguished
and diagnosed.
In August 2014, the Ministry of Public Health updated its National Plan for
the Preparation and Response to the Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak, not only
because of the outbreak in West Africa, but because a new case had developed
in Boende district, Equateur province, unrelated to the outbreak in West
Africa. 75 The revised plan included coordination with WHO, UNICEF, MSF,
and CDC. 76 On May 13, 2017, pursuant to this plan, the government deployed a
multidisciplinary team to assess the situation at Likati and prepare for the arrival
of the main response team. 77 Ministries, local governments, clinicians, NGOs,
suppliers, and donors all had clear chains of reporting to the DRC Ministry of
Health. In light of the 2014–16 emergency, “WHO had set up a $41 million
contingency fund to ensure that money would be readily available for future
72. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: U.S. Response to the Ebola
Epidemic in West Africa (Sept. 16, 2014) (available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2014/09/16/fact-sheet-us-response-ebola-epidemic-west-africa [https://perma.cc/8K
RU-5HX6]); Telephone Interview with U.S. National Institutes of Health Staff (Sept. 20, 2018).
73. Health Communication Capacity Collaborative, Social Mobilization Lessons Learned:
The Ebola Response in Liberia, JOHN’S HOPKINS CTR. FOR COMM. PROGRAMS, Feb. 2017, at 13.
74. Id.
75. Terrence McCoy, A second and different Ebola outbreak hits Congo, the fifth infected
African country, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2014/08/25/a-second-and-different-ebola-outbreak-hits-congo-the-fifth-infected
-african-country/ [https://perma.cc/GXF9-YK6X].
76. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak - Emergency
Plan of Action (EPoA), INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES (May 14,
2018), http://adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=162853.
77. Id.
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[Ebola] emergencies.” 78 This fund allowed organizations authorized by the
Ministry of Health “to quickly rent helicopters for flying personnel, generators,
and supplies into Likati.” 79
Between April 22 and May 10, the government set up coordination
committees at national, provincial, and local levels; expanded training of
healthcare personnel; contacted publicly recognized figures to raise awareness;
and drafted lists of contacts and family members. 80 The aforementioned
committees covered surveillance, medical care, laboratory and research,
communication and social mobilization, water, hygiene and sanitation,
psychosocial care, and logistics. 81
b.

Surveillance (IHR Article 5)

Article 5 of the IHR provides in relevant part that “[e]ach State Party shall
develop, strengthen and maintain, as soon as possible but no later than five years
from the entry into force of these Regulations for that State Party, the capacity
to detect, assess, notify and report events in accordance with these Regulations
. . . .” 82
i.

West Africa

Before the Ebola outbreak, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had suffered
from devastating civil wars or internal conflict, which leveled a corresponding
effect on the countries’ health system infrastructure. Under WHO assessments,
their health infrastructures were among the weakest in the world. These weak
infrastructures led to two related problems in the context of surveillance. 83
“First, the provision of healthcare and the surveillance and reporting roles often
undertaken by public authorities were fractured among dozens of nongovernmental organizations, many of which paid higher salaries or offered
employment on more favorable terms than state-administered entities of the
healthcare system.” 84 “These organizations maintained non-uniform systems for
collecting, centralizing, analyzing and transferring data” about possible EVD

78. Ed Yong, How the Democratic Republic of the Congo Beat Ebola in 42 Days, THE
ATLANTIC (July 3, 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/07/how-the-democrat
ic-republic-of-congo-beat-ebola-in-42-days/532590/ [https://perma.cc/N86K-CQW5].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, supra note 75.
82. WORLD HEALTH ORG., INT’L HEALTH REGULATIONS, PART II, ARTICLE 5 (2d ed. 2005).
83. GEORGETOWN UNIV. MED. CTR., Data Sharing during the West Africa Ebola Public
Health Emergency: Case Study Report, GLOPID-R (Nov. 2018), http://www.glopid-r.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2019/07/data-sharing-during-west-africa-ebola-public-health-emergency-case-studyreport-georgetown.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PDH-QBH9].
84. Id.
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cases. 85 “Second, when EVD cases emerged in remote areas of the most affected
countries, data about illnesses and deaths was confused with other common
causes of morbidity and mortality that occurred at high rates in all three
countries.” 86
“Inconsistent and haphazardly collected and transmitted data bottlenecked
at the hospital, ministry, and international levels.” 87 “Data quoted by Sierra
Leone’s Ministry of Health and Sanitation, for example, were inconsistent with
WHO’s which was in turn inconsistent with determinations made by responders
reporting from the field.” 88 “MSF, interpreting data based on the geographic
dispersion of cases confirmed through methods other than laboratory
confirmation and identification of family networks crossing Guinea, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone, determined that cases were spreading in the latter well before May
26, when the first case was officially confirmed.” 89 “The result was data that
justified both action and inaction by relevant stakeholders, with other political
and economic pressures favoring the latter from March until July 2014.” 90
“In Sierra Leone, the Ministry of Health and Sanitation shared data
infrequently and haphazardly with its own National Ebola Response Centre
(NERC) (which integrated UK DFID, UN, and other international
stakeholders),” but it was more readily shared with the WHO. 91 “NERC received
summary data, but not detailed data relevant to its activities.” 92 “WHO would
publish its data according to its own criteria which affected the credibility of
data issued by the NERC, which in turn had to request data from UK DFID and
other aid or public health agencies.” 93 “The delay had material, significant
effect.” 94 “According to one study, if resources committed in September and
delivered in October had done so one month earlier, 12,500 cases could have
been prevented.” 95
“Health workers immediately started tracking [individuals] who had contact
with infected individuals, eventually tracing 583 such contacts.” 96 Because there
are few or no accurate maps of the area, volunteers used their cellphones to start

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
GEORGETOWN UNIV. MED. CTR., supra note 83.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GEORGETOWN UNIV. MED. CTR., supra note 83.
Id.
Id.
Ed Yong, How the Democratic Republic of the Congo Beat Ebola in 42 Days, THE
ATLANTIC (July 3, 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/07/how-the-democrat
ic-republic-of-congo-beat-ebola-in-42-days/532590/ [https://perma.cc/N86K-CQW5].
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charting the region. 97 Villages in the Bas Uele province are generally only
accessible on foot or by bicycle or motorbike, and transferring suspect cases
safely to Ebola Treatment Centers was not possible. Outreach teams from the
Ministry of Health visited those who were ill, took blood samples, and provided
advice and medical supplies to treat the sick at home. 98
Related to the training and education of DRC’s workforce, its laboratory
capacity for Ebola detection was relatively well developed while it also made
use of rapid diagnostics and mobile laboratory technologies developed in West
Africa as part of its response. 99 Before more rapid Ebola diagnostics were
developed, several methods for detecting infection and/or disease with Ebola
virus had been developed that were amenable for use in clinical laboratory
settings. 100 Those methods fell into three basic categories: “(i) serologic tests
that detect host antibodies generated against the virus, (ii) antigen tests that
detect viral proteins, and (iii) molecular tests that detect viral RNA
sequences.” 101 Tests (i) and (ii) were available at the national laboratory in
Kinshasa. 102
The DRC made use of rapid-diagnostics that could be confirmed on the
ground within an hour and at the national laboratory in Kinshasa within a day.
The results from the first samples, subsequently confirmed by the Centre
International de Recherche Médicale de Franceville, a WHO collaborating
center in Gabon, showed the index case to have died from EVD. 103 “As soon as
the outbreak was detected, the Ministry of Health, together with WHO and other
partners, mobilized laboratory resources to ensure investigations could be
conducted as quickly as possible to guide the response.” 104 “In addition to the
testing facilities available at the INRB in Kinshasa, an INRB mobile field lab
was quickly dispatched to the affected health zone of Likati.” 105

97. Id.
98. In Equatorial Congo, WHO and its Partners Respond to an Ebola Outbreak, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/emergencies/ebola-DRC-2017/articles/working-with-partners
/en/ [https://perma.cc/5CZY-3LXY] (last visited Aug. 16, 2019).
99. Id.
100. Joint External Evaluation of the Main IHR Capacities of the Democratic Republic of
Congo, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 12-16, 2018), https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/
jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.28-fre.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WJ2-7ZW9].
101. M. Jana Broadhurst et al., Diagnosis of Ebola Virus Disease: Past, Present, and Future,
29 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY REVIEWS 773, 774 (2016).
102. New Technology Allows for Rapid Diagnosis of Ebola in Democratic Republic of the
Congo, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://afro.who.int/news/new-technology-allows-rapid-diagnosisebola-democratic-republic-congo [https://perma.cc/B5WX-RCNA] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Notification (IHR Article 6)

IHR Article 6 governing notification of relevant public health events
requires that:
a State Party shall continue to communicate to WHO timely, accurate and
sufficiently detailed public health information available to it on the notified
event, where possible including case definitions, laboratory results, source and
type of the risk, number of cases and deaths, conditions affecting the spread of
the disease and the health measures employed; and report, when necessary, the
difficulties faced and support needed in responding to the potential public health
emergency of international concern. 106

i.

West Africa

Although WHO released official case definitions of confirmed, probable,
and suspected Ebola cases, different countries adopted different testing
strategies, thereby limiting the opportunity for inter-country comparison.
Limited experience caused many cases to be over looked.
By 23 March 2014, a few scattered cases had already been imported from Guinea
into Liberia and Sierra Leone, but these cases were not detected, investigated,
or formally reported to WHO. The outbreaks in these two countries likewise
smouldered for weeks, eventually becoming visible as chains of transmission
multiplied, spilled into capital cities, and became so numerous they could no
longer be traced. 107

In Liberia, ministries (including port, airport, finance, health, and
environment), local governments, clinicians, NGOs, suppliers, and donors all
collected data related to identifying cases and taking immediate action, but there
was “no information sharing” because there was no centralized authority or
resource to do so. 108 Even within data collected, inconsistences limited
usefulness. “Dates recorded on a case document might have referred
ambiguously to when data was collected, submitted, or edited.” 109

106. WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Health Regulations, art. 6 (2005), https://www.who.
int/ihr/publications/9789241580496/en/ [https://perma.cc/EA6T-8GL7].
107. Factors that Contributed to Undetected Spread of the Ebola Virus and Impeded Rapid
Containment, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 2015), https://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-yearreport/factors/en/ [https://perma.cc/9LTX-BL3Y].
108. Leon Schreiber, Chasing an Epidemic: Coordinating Liberia’s Response to Ebola, 201415, PRINCETON UNIV., https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/ebola-chasing-epi
demic-coordinating-liberia-response [https://perma.cc/3JNH-5MYX] (last visited Aug. 23, 2019).
109. Data Sharing During the West Africa Ebola Pub. Health Emergency: Case Study Report,
GEORGETOWN UNIV. MED. CTR., http://www.glopid-r.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/datasharing-during-west-africa-ebola-public-health-emergency-case-study-report-georgetown.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EMQ-43YE] (last visited Aug 23, 2019).
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DRC

The Provincial Health Division issued an alert on May 8, 2017, seventeen
days after the death of the index case, and on May 9, the DRC’s Ministry of
Health informed WHO about undiagnosed illness and deaths including
hemorrhagic symptoms in the Likati Health Zone. 110 On May 11, the INRB in
Kinshasa confirmed that one of five samples sent from Likati had tested positive
for Ebola, and the Ministry of Heath established seven national committees and
dispatched investigative teams 111
In April 2017, the WHO’s Strategic Advisory Group of Experts
recommended use of an experimental Ebola vaccine should an outbreak occur,
delivered in a ring vaccination strategy and under an Expanded Access
Framework. 112 Pursuant to the recommendation, the DRC Ministry of Health
established ethics review and regulatory channels for approval of the
experimental vaccine under an Expanded (or Compassionate Use) Access
Framework. 113 On May 11, the DRC Ministry of Health initiated discussions on
the use of experimental vaccine with WHO and MSF. 114 “A WHO/Global
Outbreak Alert and Response Network team and an MSF Ebola vaccine team
were deployed to support implementation.” 115
Communication between the Ministry of Health, Merck (the manufacturer
of the vaccine), MSF, and WHO was fluid and frequent during the outbreak, and
the DRC maintained both ethics review and regulatory channels for approval of
the experimental vaccine rVSV-ZEBOV, which was approved for priority
groups on May 29. 116 The Ministry of Health in partnership with WHO
developed a plan for establishing and maintaining a cold chain for the vaccine,
including borrowing a -60°C -90°C freezer from the Ministry of Health in

110. Ebola Virus Disease – Democratic Republic of the Congo: External Situation Report 15,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 12, 2018), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/273088/SI
TREP_EVD_DRC_20180712-eng.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/E6HV-Q7SV].
111. New Technology Allows for Rapid Diagnosis of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/ebola-DRC-2017/articles/rapiddiagnosis/en/ [https://perma.cc/U56K-QUJ7] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019); External Situation
Report 9, Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of the Congo, (May 22, 2017) WORLD
HEALTH ORG., apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/255564/EbolaDRC-22052017.pdf?se
quence=1 [https://perma.cc/ZS2Y-N42B].
112. Workshop on Expanded Access to Experimental Ebola Vaccines During Outbreaks,
WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/blueprint/expanded-access-ebola-vaccines.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/A3WR-M9H9] (last visited Aug. 30, 2019).
113. Amy Maxmen, Ebola Vaccine Approved for Use in Ongoing Outbreak, NATURE (May 30,
2017), https://www.nature.com/news/ebola-vaccine-approved-for-use-in-ongoing-outbreak-1.22
024 [https://perma.cc/UNF3-MMT5].
114. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 112.
115. Id.
116. Maxmen, supra note 113.
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Guinea, which was packed and ready to be shipped in forty-eight hours. 117 Total
time for all logistics, including transportation of doses from a stockpile in
Geneva, was one week post approval. 118 The ethics review committee discussed
with MSF forms for informed consent and a ring vaccination strategy to
immunize contacts of suspected and confirmed patients, the contacts of those
contacts, and health workers. 119 The outbreak was contained before these plans
became necessary to operationalize.
d.

Public Health Response (IHR Article 13)

Article 13 of the IHR requires “Each State Party shall develop, strengthen
and maintain, as soon as possible but no later than five years from the entry into
force of these Regulations . . . the capacity to respond promptly and effectively
to public health risks and public health emergencies of international concern as
set out in Annex 1.” 120 Article 13 further includes the ability of countries to
request assistance from WHO, including the coordination of international
partners for public health emergencies of international concern. 121
i.

West Africa

As for surveillance and detection, capacity to respond was significantly
limited in the most affected West African countries, and that capacity was
largely spread over the informal sector. 122 The public health response, between
March and July 2014 was not generally mediated through national governments,
but rather through entities employed by major funders: the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, CDC, the CDC Foundation, DFID, the Paul Allen Foundation, the
UK government, and USAID among the most significant. 123 These entities
experienced barriers coordinating responses between themselves. “Without
agreement about the mutually beneficial roles, responsibilities, and legitimate
contributions of clinicians, scientists, and public health authorities, parties end

117. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 112.
118. Stephanie Soucheray, WHO: Ebola Vaccine Could Be Deployed Within a Week, CIDRAP
(May 18, 2017), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2017/05/who-ebola-vaccine-couldbe-deployed-within-week [https://perma.cc/FY24-LN9D].
119. Id.; External Situation Report 22, Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of the Congo,
(June 8, 2017), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/255630/EbolaDRC-06062017.pdf
?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/ZS2Y-N42B].
120. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 107.
121. Id.
122. Ebola: Pushed to the limit and beyond, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (Mar. 23, 2015),
https://www.msf.org/ebola-pushed-limit-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/KW82-C23A].
123. Data Sharing during the West Africa Ebola Public Health Emergency: Case Study Report,
GEORGETOWN UNIV. MED. CTR. (Nov. 2018), http://www.glopid-r.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/
07/data-sharing-during-west-africa-ebola-public-health-emergency-case-study-report-george
town.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTR4-WUN6].
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up either encroaching on one another or not communicating.” 124 These practices
are reflected in the retrospective reports entities drafted for donors and others,
emphasizing number of geographic locations in which there was a presence,
number of volunteers trained, and number of staff hired. 125
ii.

DRC

The 2017 outbreak was guided by the International Health Regulations, the
response component of which had been informed by the experience in Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The DRC’s 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE)
demonstrated “a considerable commitment of the authorities of the Democratic
Republic of Congo in the process of improving the implementation capacity of
the IHR (2005) through the creation of a Congolese agency for the prevention
and control of diseases and the establishment of short-term plan for an integrated
and multisectoral national plan for strengthening health security.” 126 Its highest
scores (three or four indicating, respectively, developed capacity and
demonstrated capacity) under the JEE framework were for its system of
epidemiological training, its strategy for its healthcare workforce, and its
emergency response program. 127
In addition, the National Plan Health Development Plan 2016-2020 and the
Guide to Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response revised in 2011 include
provisions for the adequate implementation of the IHR (2005). 128 In most
sectors, there is legislation, regulations, administrative requirements, and other
relevant government instruments for the implementation of the IHR (2005). At
the institutional level, the NFP RSI is appointed within the National Border
Hygiene attached to the Ministry of Health. The country also has a National
Coordinating Committee (NCC) within the Ministry of Health in the event of an
outbreak. 129
While the DRC still faces significant barriers with respect to the adoption
and dissemination of laws relevant to the IHR, communication and coordination
between ministries, surveillance capacity, its NFP, national coordinating

124. Id.; see also Ben Goldacre, Sian Harrison, Kamal R. Mahtani, et al., WHO Consultation
on Data and Results Sharing During Public Health Emergencies, CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED
MED. (Sep. 2015), http://www.who.int/medicines/ebola-treatment/background_briefing_on_data_
results_sharing_during_phes.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L5C-J2LX].
125. Social Mobilization Lessons Learned: The Ebola Response in Liberia, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIV. (Feb. 2017), www.healthcommcapacity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Ebola-LessonsLearned-ksm.pdf [https://perma.cc/A36E-U25Q].
126. Joint External Evaluation of the Democratic Republic of Congo, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Mar. 12-16, 2018), https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.28fre.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4P7-CD5M].
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Id. at 6.
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committee, and emergency response plans functioned well in support of the
response to the 2017 outbreak. This coordination was attributed to agreements
that clearly defined roles, transparent and agreed-upon categories of data needed
for the trials to show evidence of safety and efficacy, and adequate resources to
enroll volunteers, conduct trials, and gather information. Response was run from
the central government generally and Kinshasa specifically, where dedicated
committees executed clear, well-defined roles. The national government
established committees overseeing surveillance, medical care, laboratory and
research, communication and social mobilization, water, hygiene and sanitation,
psychosocial care, and logistics. While major non-governmental organizations
and international organizations including ALIMA, IFRC, MSF, UNICEF, and
WHO were invited to participate in the response, they did so according to a
national emergency action plan overseen by DRC authorities. Before the 2017
outbreak, the previous eight largest outbreaks of Ebola took on average two
months to be recognized and confirmed; the 2017 outbreak took only nineteen
days. 130
After alerting international partners on May 9, consistent with its national
plan of action, the Ministry of Health dispatched a team including doctors,
nurses, logisticians, water and sanitation experts, health promoters, and an
epidemiologist. 131 On the same day, MSF sent a team of fourteen support staff
including physicians. 132 On May 12, a cargo plane with fifteen tons of medical
and logistical supplies flew from Kinshasa to Kisangani, which is connected to
Buta, the capital of Bas Uele Province, by a newly repaired road stretching 324
km. 133 Likati is 150 km from Buta over rugged terrain, but all people and
supplies nevertheless arrived in Buta on May 16. 134 By May 17, aid groups were
setting up centers for treatment and isolation, and mobile labs. 135 Health centers

130. Years of Ebola Disease Outbreaks, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/chronology.html [https://perma.cc/LL4Y-EMC2] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2019); External Situation Report 1, Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of
Congo, (May 15, 2017) apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/255419/EbolaDRC-1552017eng.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/ZS2Y-N42B].
131. World Health Organization, DRC: Response to The Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak in BasUele Likati: First joint visit of the Minister of Health and the WHO Representative to the epicenter
of the Ebola virus disease outbreak (May 7, 2017), https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republiccongo/drc-response-ebola-virus-disease-outbreak-bas-uele-likati-first [https://perma.cc/MAY2-FJ
CJ].
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Denise Grady, Suspected Cases of Ebola Rise to 29 in Democratic Republic of Congo,
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/world/africa/ebola-outbreakcongo-virus.html [https://perma.cc/76KH-DFGV].
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throughout the province regularly sent out alerts through the national
surveillance system. 136
A number of community engagement mechanisms enabled more rapid
public health response. Most villages in the Bas Uele province are only
accessible on foot or by bicycle or motorbike. 137 “Outreach teams from the
Ministry of Health and with partner support, visit those who are ill, take blood
samples and provide advice and medical supplies to treat the sick at home.” 138
Communicators about Ebola, especially how to prevent its spread, were selected
according to their credibility in the community, literacy, and willingness to
participate. 139 The Ministry of Health worked with UNICEF and WHO to
develop a two-day training for these volunteers, who spread out to the
surrounding health zones to inform the public about how to protect themselves
from Ebola and avoid spread of the disease. 140 Jean-Jacques Muyembe-Tamfum,
director-general of the National Institute for Biomedical Research in Kinshasa,
engaged affected communities immediately, building their trust in medical
teams and helping them understand the importance of not touching others in
checking the spread of the virus. 141
Surveillance, health facility, and clinical data was shared rapidly through the
channels described above. The Ebola containment effort added several places
not reflected on existing maps (towns and villages), often on the basis of
descriptions from local sources. Some places already present in the RGC were
re-localized when GPS recordings or recent digitizations were available from
other sources. Because contact tracing was so swift and shared so readily
between responding partners (ALIMA, CDC, MSF, and WHO), Ministry of
Health personnel were able to confirm two cases of Ebola quickly and identify
and follow the next and final six that followed. By May 28, there were seventeen
suspected cases in the DRC awaiting a diagnosis, and all contacts remained
under surveillance. 142 Sixty-seven percent of the computer simulations run by
136. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 131.
137. In equatorial Congo, WHO and its partners respond to an Ebola outbreak, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/emergencies/ebola-DRC-2017/articles/working-with-part
ners/en/ [https://perma.cc/9RYR-ABW6] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Amy Maxmen, Ebola Vaccine Could Get its First Real-World Test in Emerging Outbreak,
NATURE (May 12, 2017), https://www.nature.com/news/ebola-vaccine-could-get-first-real-worldtest-in-emerging-outbreak-1.21989 [https://perma.cc/BL8T-Q7GS]; Jean-Jacques Muyembe
Tamfum: a life’s work on Ebola, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/96/
12/18-031218/en/ [https://perma.cc/8MQL-HZ44] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
142. Ebola Virus Disease – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Disease Outbreak News,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 13, 2017), https://www.who.int/csr/don/13-may-2017-ebola-drc/en/
[https://perma.cc/H2DA-5P9P]; Stephanie Soucheray, Who confirms 2nd Ebola case in DRC; 17
suspected, CTR. FOR INFECTIONS DISEASE RESEARCH AND POLICY (May 15, 2017), www.cidrap.
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DRC Ministry of Health predicted that there would be no further cases in the
next month, and the outbreak was declared over on July 2, forty-two days after
the last confirmed case tested negative for Ebola the second time (two twentyone day incubation cycles of the virus). 143
CONCLUSION
There are models for effective Ebola response that demonstrate the
soundness of the IHR (2005) and provide good models for the integration of
international partners. These models often grow from previous experiences with
emergencies governed by the IHR, including those where a PHEIC is not
declared. Indeed, in the current outbreak in the DRC participation of
international partners has been crucial, even if data and response coordination
remains imperfect and also faces a stronger, militarized resistance. In the context
of the Ebola outbreak in the DRC, rapid containment was achieved in the face
of significant resource scarcity, poor physical infrastructure, and limited
healthcare infrastructure. Because the DRC acted quickly, through a framework
consistent with the International Health Regulations, especially as they
functioned in 2014-16 West Africa; invested in the training of its best doctors
and nurses to the Ebola threat; communicated clearly and through credible
outlets; devoted resources to contact tracing and surveillance; and established
regulatory channels for diagnostics and vaccines, it was able to identify and
respond to Ebola in record time.

umn.edu/news-perspective/2017/05/who-confirms-2nd-ebola-case-drc-17-suspected [https://per
ma.cc/B4AF-GDYF].
143. Maxmen, supra note 113; End of the most recent Ebola outbreak in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Ebola outbreak Democratic Republic of the Congo 2017, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Jul. 2, 2017), https://www.who.int/emergencies/ebola-DRC-2017/en/ [https://perma.cc/VJ6
E-5ED5].
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